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Abstract - As billions of people turn to their technologically elite phones and laptops for
immediate information, online groups have learned how to take advantage of social media
patterns and isolate people into a specific belief or carefully tailored platforms that eliminate
opposing ideas. Extremist groups’ online presence have been studied as individual dilemmas,
rather than being studied for patterns to combat the rapidly increasing radicalization of people
who had no claim to these beliefs before social media. This study will contrast the online
presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the January 6th insurrectionists in
terms of platforms usage, targeted populations, and effectiveness. Analysis of two distinctly
opposing groups for their evolution of recruitment tactics and propaganda strategies can become
the foundation for creating an online system that rejects groups who promote and breed violence
in real life.
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Introduction
January 6th, 2021, over seven hundred American citizens stormed into the Congressional
Office Building in attempts to stop the certification of the electoral college vote from the 2020
presidential election (U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2022). Of those who stormed the building, around
four hundred were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for disorderly and disruptive
conduct along with entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds (U.S. Attorney’s
Office, 2022). While the rioting occurred, far-right political groups were named to have planned,
led, and executed the storm under the social media movement #StopTheSteal, which emerged
earlier in November 2020. Surrounding the United States Presidential election on November 3rd,
2020, after the votes were called too close to confirm on election day, suspicion of election
integrity with fake mail-in ballots and theories of vote tapering swept across the country as
people logged onto their social media platforms to speak about the election (Holt and Atlantic
Council’s Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab), 2021). Several extremist groups took hold of the
immense feelings of skepticism, and uncertainty that developed in Americans during the election
certification; many of those who fell victim to the groups’ rhetoric did not have strong political
ideologies to those groups before November 3rd, 2020 (Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFRLab,
2021). Before the three months of social media posts, skewed news article and constant
television coverage between November 3rd and January 6th, the #StopTheSteal movement’s
members did not have strong ties to any political group nor extreme ideological views against the
United States government. This fact insinuates that a three-month period and access to social
media accounts were the two factors needed to get seven hundred people to risk their well-being
in connection with extremist groups.
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How did online extremists radicalize a majority of the persons present into committing
serious felonies and acts of violence against the United States government? The short answer,
social media. A few manipulated social media algorithms, committed recruiters, and content
markets, and billions of people on the internet ended with the speedy radicalization of persons.
Many news sources and political articles focus on what went down on January 6th, 2020:
the initial break past barriers, the people hurt or killed, and the nation's response to the attack on
the Capitol building. Instead of the timeline of January 6th, I will look back further into
November 2020.
On top of the specifics of the #StopTheSteal extremism, I display another welldocumented extremist group that used online social media tactics to radicalize otherwise nonconnected individuals by creating targeted online propaganda. In the early 2010’s, a religious
terror group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria utilized numerous social media
algorithms to promote their religious views and radicalize foreigners into performing acts of
violence under their wing. Starting in the early 2010’s, the terrorist organization flooded social
media platforms with photos, videos, and quotes all boosting up the organization and trapping
individuals into the group’s ideology (Williams, 2016). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
managed to recruit numerous Americans into their ranks and move to Middle Eastern countries
they occupied to strengthen their ranks (Williams, 2016). The group created specific rank
positions for technical savvy members to create content across the Internet that drummed up
support and brought in thousands of recruits.
This thesis looks at how social media recruitment that ends with in-person violence for
extremist groups has evolved into the current day. Extremism is a tale as old as time, but the
Internet is fairly new and how extremism grows has changed with its creation. I will be
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evaluating ISIS’s online presence during their peak online presence in the year 2014 and
#stopthesteal movement between 2020-2021 in hopes to find similarities, patterns, trends,
evolutions or anything to help understand how extremists have evolved and how to curb violence
despite these expansions.
As the internet continues to expand (phones, laptops, computers, homes, cars, wallets),
studying how groups have used it in recruiting members has become increasingly important and
more difficult. The paper will plainly display that online extremism is a bigger problem than
previously thought and shine a light into what the future may look like if social media companies
do not pay attention to their site usage or if people do not learn how they can become trapped
into a spiral into radicalization and violence.
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Definitions
This thesis is an analysis of two distinctive online presences in the process of
radicalization. The writer is in the Political Science area and the thesis heavily leans on political
science ideas and literature. As such the paper will reflect political science studies by defining
the important words and word distinctions early to lay groundwork to defy the ‘common’
language that has separate connotations than the language necessary to understand the paper to
its fullest.
Terrorism
The major distinctions that need to be addressed and laid out to create a clear-cut
difference are the words extremism and terrorism. The United Nations Security Council (2004,
pg. 2) Resolution 1566 gives a well-respected definition of terrorism that legal studies, political
science studies, security studies and others all use as a definition:
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of
terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act.
The UN’s definitions have three major pieces that categorizes terrorism as different from
other acts of violence. The pieces of acts against civilians, intent to cause death or bodily harm,
and provoking a state of terror, do not appear in every violent act and help to create a definite
wordage.
Extremism
Extremism, on the other hand, is much broader and more complex. Extremism is the
belief system of involving end-of-the spectrum ideas, normally politically or religiously. This
‘common’ definition is vague and filled with gray areas. What is extreme is hard to define in
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broad senses. For this thesis, extremism will be the holding of views, political or religious, that
do not reflect a majority of person’s or require extreme actions to complete an end goal. Many
people can believe that overpopulation has resulted in problems for the international community
but using genocide to curb overpopulation is not a view held by a majority of persons; this would
be considered an extremist view with this definition.
Terrorism and Extremism
Terrorism can be extremism and extremism can be terrorism; however, the two terms do
not depend on the other. They are related but not interchangeable. Many unknown persons were
inducted into extremism over social media but only some commit terrorist acts. Extremism can
be a stepping stone to terrorism. Another piece that muddles the definitions of terrorism and
extremism is violent extremism. Erroll Southers’ book (2017) covering homegrown violent
extremism states that “violent extremism occurs when individuals or groups openly express their
ideological beliefs through violence or a call for violence (pg. 4)”. Violent extremism can be
without targeting innocent civilians or the creation of terror in others, specifically politically,
which separates violent extremism from terrorism.
Radicalization
With the distinctions of extremism and terrorism, radicalization needs to be addressed
and defined. Radicalization is the process of bringing someone from simple or normal opinions
about reform into extremist views on those topics (Southers, 2017). Someone is radicalized into
extremism through many different channels. Radicalization can be completely self-motivated or
more in tune with my themes, with the influences of others on one’s beliefs. Radicalization can
be used as a word for simply being indoctrinated into a viewpoint, good or bad. However, this
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paper will largely cover the process of radicalization into physical violence, so radicalization will
carry a negative connotation.
Propaganda
The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of propaganda is “The systematic
dissemination of information, esp. in a biased or misleading way, in order to promote a political
cause or point of view (2007).” This thesis broadens the definition a little to promote a cause or
point of view. Later in the thesis, especially in the literature review, it is shown that propaganda
is committed by any group of people, not just those looking for specific political gains.
Propaganda can also be used in positive efforts to promote causes such as human rights, civil
rights, and the treatment of others.
Insurrection(ist)
During and after the events on Jan 6th, 2021, to stop the certification of the 2020
presidential election, the persons involved, and the actions taken have been dubbed the January
6th Insurrectionist by mainstream American media (Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFRLab,
2021). While what happened during Jan 6th especially those who assaulted, harassed etc. the
police and Congress people could be considered terrorist acts as some actions contained all
necessary pieces, modern media has dubbed as an insurrection. As to not confuse anyone, I will
too.
Insurrectionists, or the people involved physically with the attack and occupation of the
Capitol, were a combination of QAnon supporters, Proud Boys, Three Percenters, Oath Keepers,
and many non-group affiliated persons (District of Columbia v Proud Boys International, 2021
Center of Extremism, 2022 & Pape, 2021). The same persons actively partook in online forums
surrounding the #stopthesteal movement. The Insurrectionists are only those who physically
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showed up in Washington D.C. on January 6th, but the #stopthesteal movement had many
supporters who did not attend.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
As previously mentioned, the religious extremist group that my data will revolve around
is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Commonly abbreviated as ISIS, the group has many names
associated with it, including but not limited to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, Daesh, and
the Islamic State (Cunningham, Everton, & Schroeder, 2015). Between scholarly studies and
common mainstream news outlets, the group’s most used name is ISIS, so the thesis will stick to
the name ISIS for audience ease of recognition.
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Literature Review
Propaganda and extremism are concepts that have persisted since war first plagued the
Earth, even before humans defined the terms. There is extensive research into the histories of
both areas and how they have evolved. Books of wartime tactics, scholarly articles about antigovernment attacks and their aftershocks, newsletters covering how pictures from war can
influence the home front, and even the pictures painted on cave walls have revolved around how
one’s ideology can be twisted and used against another. The literature review is going to cover a
history of propaganda, extremism literature, and a brief review of ISIS to preface their social
media presence.
Propaganda Literature
Despite propaganda’s negative connotation in mainstream media, propaganda can be, and
has been, used for numerous reasons across the globe. Scholars have spent centuries looking into
how information can affect one’s mindset, for better or for worse. Large scale propaganda
campaigns have been put into effects numerous times, especially by governments and
organizations surrounding war and strife. Literature in propaganda has shifted in focus areas, as
propaganda has evolved from art and porcelain drawings (Lobanov-Rostovsky, 1989) to film and
radio creations (Taylor, 2013) to the modern-day social media post.
Propaganda began to influence humans before we had the modern written word. Philip
Taylor’s book on propaganda (2013, pg. 19-48) expresses how Romans and Greeks in the fourth
century BC centuries used “visual symbolism” and drawn pictures to exaggerate their war
victories to incoming enemies. Wartime propaganda campaigns, especially surrounding World
War I, World War II, and the Cold War, are largely studied by political scientists and historians
for their massive effects on home fronts. In a 1927 article (pg. 627 - 631), Harold Lasswell
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describes the propaganda of the 1920’s surrounding Black and white voting ideology, and how
he believed attitude influenced people. While the article is viewed as aged to a modern
researcher, it shows that propaganda was always on academia’s mind, even in times of global
peace.
Past the World Wars and the Cold War, we continue to see propaganda seep into our
lives through our technology. Academics from the 21st century that research propaganda can
come from digital media experts, marketing scholars or computer data analysts. Propaganda’s
reach into technology has interlinked political studies and communication & media studies in
new ways. Taylor (2013, pg. 323) comments on this by saying “[the] Chinese government
continues to find ways of building a great firewall to ‘protect’ its citizens from the free flow of
global information, and disinformation” and shows that limiting information online can be a
form of propaganda that is used today. In similar ways, private corporations online can begin to
take similar steps as the Chinese government. The vast technological machines that have
revolutionized how humans communicate and how we transmit information create a new
platform for propaganda that will be consistently used as a tool if humans continue to use it.
Extremism Literature
Exactly as propaganda has been plaguing society since humans first began to build
communities and cities, extremism has followed. Movement after movement have turned into
extremist groups and taken steps to harm their perceived enemies. Literature surrounding
extremism comes in two large forms, the study of specific movements and how they grew (or
were destroyed) and the study of how extremism keeps repeating itself again.
Extremism revolves around an ‘us versus them’ mentality and scholars have tried to
pinpoint the starting point of extremism; however as J.M. Berger, the author of numerous articles
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and books on the topic of extremism, details the shortcomings of literature exploring how
extremism starts by saying, “Decades of research have failed to answer [why do people embrace
extremism] definitively, or more accurately, decades of research have carefully eliminated many
proposed explanations (Berger, 2018, pg. 113).” Professors, researchers, and scholars in general
cannot find a specific category or factor that definitively escalates ideology to extremist beliefs.
Due to the unexplained answer to how extremism starts, scholars have created paper after paper
trying and testing new theories. Due to the hardships surrounding an extremist groups origin and
possible theoretical justifications, this thesis is taking in account the actions of groups after they
have established themselves as extremist, and in both cases violent extremists,
On top of the lack of explanations of extremism, many other scholars have limited their
research to religious extremism. This focus on one of the categories over the others, has
unfortunately painted extremism as a strictly religious problem; Religious ideology that results in
terrorism is not the only example of extremism; isolating the research into one area reaffirms the
view point that extremism is only a problem for religious terrorists. The reality is anyone can
become an extremist regardless of religion, education, homelife, relationships, etc. Extremism is
so broad a topic that anything can become extremism and assuming that extremism only happens
with terrorism is inaccurate.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Background
Scholars have searched into the formation, historical actions, and ideological views of
ISIS since its creation in 1999. Emerging as a subsection of Al Qaeda, a terror group that
attacked Western society in the 1990s, the Islamic State terrorist organization would be later
responsible for the largest terror attack against the United States and quickly grow into the
largest terror group in the world in our modern day (Cunningham, Everton, & Schroeder, 2015).
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As ISIS started out in Al Qaeda’s shadow, the assassination of Al Qaeda’s leader Osama
Bin Laden by the US military in 2011 which opened the floodgates for ISIS to begin their
acceleration in recruitment of members and strength in the Middle East. ISIS flourished in the
Middle East, Iraq Syria Iran etc. 2014 was a peak year for the presence of ISIS online
(Cunningham, Everton, & Schroeder, 2015, pg. 15). ISIS was the focus of American military
strikes and slowly decreased size and power by the modern day. ISIS was particularly effective
at furthering their cause overseas by means of online propaganda and recruitment. (Berger,
2014). ISIS was a diligent and efficient terror group and created entire sectors to figure ways to
manipulate social media and to get people to support their future ideas without having physical
connections with the people.
Uses and Gratifications Theory
A mass communications theory called the Uses and Gratifications Theory has been linked to how
individuals on the Internet use social media platforms. What people decide to post themselves,
reblog from others, or what appears on their homepage is all influenced by what an individual
receives from their time on social media platforms. While the Uses and Gratification Theory was
originally created before the invention and study of the World Wide Web and the billions of
communications that occur across the Internet, current scholars are bridging the gap between the
theory that reflects why individuals respond to media they way they do and the newest and
consistently changing form of mass media (Korhan and Ersoy, 2015). The answer of why
individuals get roped into extremist groups can often be connected to what a person feels when
they are found by the group, or from the gratification that comes from daily and reassuring
communications, online or in-person. This theory, while not pivotal to the collection of
resources, provides a solid background and theoretical standpoint for the usage of social media
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sites as a platform for extremist’s groups to find persons that could be influenced and radicalized
into a new viewpoint that aligns with the group’s ideology. Uses and Gratification Theory in
connection with the Internet and mass communications that occurs on the web helps verify my
thesis results and discussion about the radicalization process and its speed over the Internet.
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Methodology
This study takes the foundation of two groups and their online presence that are distinctly
opposites and establishes if the groups have anything in common in their millions of online
interactions and posted propaganda despite polarizing ideologies. My overall approach was to
collect sources from organizations who record information about the two groups’ online usage
and public displays of information and build two separate case studies on the secondary sources.
With two extremist case studies, I will lean on both qualitative sources, such as personal stories
about radicalization into the groups, and quantitative data sets, such as the amount of Twitter
posts that use a certain hashtag, to piece together any possible connections. The comparative
light to the case studies and the usage of both styles of data will allow for positive connections to
be recognized without looking for specific predetermined results. The research, both quantitative
and qualitative, that will be compared was validated by the transparency of their methodology in
collecting their data and by the sources which collected and analyzed it. Each source was vetted
and their collection methods and rigor in test results were confirmed so the data found reflected
high-quality academic work.
Limitations and Justifications
Even for non-profit academic think tanks and large organizations that found data used in
my thesis, social media networks would not give up all primary data that may be related to the
study. Even if I could get my hands on the data, a one-woman team can not properly analyze or
assess all the content. It would take years to quantify and understand the data before making
proper quantitative objectives, especially because harmful content, specific propaganda groups,
and lone spreader accounts are constantly removed from numerous sites. If there is data from
these groups online, they are nearly all password-protected or using top of the line end-to-end
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encryption. The rest of the data is deleted. In their academic study of ISIS on Telegram, Bloom,
Tiflati, and Horgan (2017, pg. 1243) point out the extra barriers to studying extremists online,
the language barrier has been a primary challenge—the majority of the ISIS
Telegram channels, and chat rooms operate in Arabic. For academic researchers studying
online radicalization, an additional challenge has been getting university-sponsored
institutional review boards (IRB) to have this research approved by their ethics
committees
While there are barriers and obstacles that occurred while collecting data and references, the
limitations did not make drastic changes to the intended methodology and eventual results.

Specific Sources of Data
The data collected for the study are sets that databases or groups have already compiled
by the following organizations or academics. J.M. Berger and partner Jonathon Morgan created a
quantitative study into how ISIS used Twitter.com in 2014. The data analysis, labeled The ISIS
Twitter Census (2015), had researched posts made in connection with ISIS beliefs, accounts that
interacted with other ISIS members and the daily activity among numerous other analytical data
collected from Twitter. The 65-page analysis paper was published by the Brookings Project on
U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. While J.M. Berger is the author with the most experience
in the political and historical effects of propaganda, Jonathon Morgan was the author with a
background in data sciences who could collect and analyze the complete raw data found from
their search into how the terror group operated on Twitter.
As for the #stopthesteal data, the Center of Extremism (2022) at the Anti-Defamation
League posthumously collected data over the Internet from the dates November 3rd, 2020, to
December 13th, 2021. The Center of Extremism pulled largely from Twitter but included major
events and online data from the places they originated, such as on-air broadcasts that influenced

15

the January 6th insurrection and the political scene surrounding the November 3rd Presidential
election that sparked the #stopthesteal movement to physical responses. Along with the Center of
Extremism, the Just Security (Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFR lab, 2021) organization also
searched into the #stopthesteal movement with more information from before the November
election. The Holt and Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab created a timeline that
builds to the January 6th events but not focusing on quantitative data. Since the Center of
Extremism and the Just Security data could very well overlap with the other group’s data, the
two sets of data will not be combined but used in separate incidents.
For some of the comparison results between ISIS and #stopthesteal, the group used to
represent the #stopthesteal movement is reflected by the individuals arrested by the Federal
Bureau of Investigations for the Capitol Riots. The FBI collected and cataloged the persons
arrested and displayed their names and charges on their websites (U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2022).
For the comparison, I extrapolated the arrested persons’ gender (based on pronouns in the formal
court documents) and location of where they were arrested (American state) from the court
documents publicly given. These documents clearly stated pronouns and where the individual
was being arrested or tried, so the public data was recorded in basic forms of Name of the
Defendant, Location of Indictment, Charge(s), and Gender of the Defendant. Locations were
tallied by US states (with the inclusion of Washington D.C. and a category for Unknown for
anonymity for several persons) and gender was calculated as a simple addition. My data
collected was put into percentages of the total and shown plainly.
Along with the quantitative data that was collected of the online social media posts
involving the groups, both groups have qualitative examples of the radicalization of persons to
their side. Both subjects, American women, encountered the group online and had contact with
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members online consistently for months (Callimachi, 2015 and Andrews, 2020). Their stories
have been publicly published with their permission, so their stories are used to compare
recruitment examples.
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Results
After a collection and analysis of credible sources and their individual attempts to sift
through the massive amounts of extremism that occurs online, I found the following categories
from both groups. Each of the results deduced from both groups have been split into categories
and the corresponding groups’ results follow. Along with the written results, the findings are
reflected in a table on page 23 in a simplified manner to ease comparison.
Popular Social Media Sites
ISIS used Twitter (Berger and Morgan, 2015), Archive.org (Cunningham, Everton, &
Schroeder, 2015, pg. 6), justpaste.it (Cunningham, Everton, & Schroeder, 2015 pg. 6), and
created an add-on to Twitter named Dawn of Glad Tidings (Berger, 2014) and has moved largely
to Telegram (Bloom, Tiflati, & Horgan, 2017)
#stopthesteal largely spread across Twitter (Vogel, Auxier, & Anderson, 2021), Facebook
(Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFR Lab, 2021), Parler (Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFR Lab,
2021), Telegram (Daly and Fischer, 2021) for chatting social media platforms. #stopthesteal also
shifted into visual media site YouTube.
Common Hashtags and Phrases
In the search into ISIS-related hashtags across Twitter, there emerged two distinctive
tactics within their propaganda, “At least 151,617 hashtags that included one of four mostcommon variations on the spelling of “Islamic State” in Arabic were detected (Berger and
Morgan, 2015 pg. 22)”, so ISIS largely surrounded their group with its namesake. However, ISIS
also ‘stole’ popular but unrelated hashtags. Whenever other topics were trending on websites,
especially Twitter, the group would stage mass accounts to fill the hashtag with ISIS propaganda
to spread their message to anyone who looked at the trending hashtag. Cunningham, Everton, &
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Schroeder pointed out the 2014 World Cup hashtag was flooded with ISIS propaganda, tweets,
photos, videos, anything related to ISIS
The whole movement was named after the single most used hashtag, #stopthesteal, so the
most common hashtags was #stopthesteal. However, the movement also used, phrases in relation
to the election integrity from November 3rd such as rigged election and stolen election (Holt and
Atlantic Council’s DFR Lab, 2021)
Recruitment Styles
ISIS recruitment over the Internet involved the creation and production of propaganda
online, interacting with sympathizers or anyone that would reply to their posts, continuously
message them, get target to convert to Islam, and move to their ‘caliphate’ or pieces of Iraq and
Syria that were under ISIS control (Callimachi, 2015). ISIS online recruitment tactics were
targeted at individuals in the Middle Eastern, African, and Western countries, anyone could be a
recruit (Berger 2014, Cunningham, Everton, & Schroeder, 2015, and Turk, 2004).
#stopthesteal members produce propaganda online, largely within the United States,
reach out to anyone with doubts about the November 3rd election or doubts over politicians,
bring them into group chats across different sites, before moving the topic to #stopthesteal and
what to do in response to the election (Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFR Lab, 2021). This pattern
is also consistent with other right-wing political groups in their attempts to promote and expand
their groups (Wahlstrom and Tornberg, 2019)
Specific Recruitment Examples
For recruitment examples, both groups managed to radicalize an American woman into
their ideology, but both women were prevented from fully participating in the group’s physical
activities. It was the barriers to either woman becoming a wife to an ISIS member or
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participating in the January 6th insurrection that allowed for both women to tell their stories to
reporters.
For example, of ISIS recruitment efforts, an American young woman approached ISIS
online about a beheading video posted online. In a public and very personal anecdote that was
published by the New York Times by Rukmini Callimachi in 2015, the woman detailed what life
looked like while being recruited. After making initial contact with several online ISIS members
who explained to her why ISIS posts graphic images and videos, she continued to be chatted
with, specifically by one gentleman, over the course of months. She received gifts and Islamic
books from overseas before making the move from Christianity to Islam, which she officially
announced over Twitter. The young woman was in the process of being wed off to an ISIS
member before legal guardians stepped in and cut off connections with her friends on Twitter
and Skype.
#stopthesteal, specifically members of #stopthesteal who belonged to the QAnon
ideology, recruited an American middle-aged woman. The woman, who documented her story in
a memoir, told Washington Post writer Travis Andrews (2020) She found the group on a health,
wellness, and spirituality website before following the ideology into other forums and different
websites. The ideology moved topics as she moved sites and ended with political beliefs
surrounding COVID-19 and its QAnon propaganda. After being introduced and surrounded in
the beliefs, she moved into publicly declaring the ideology online on sites Instagram and
Facebook. She had a public mental break that ended in physical attack of property and the
involvement of law enforcement. She was briefly involuntarily hospitalized and moved away
from those political beliefs all before the January 6th insurrection (Andrews, 2020).
Gender of Recruits
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Based on information collected by the group New America after analysis of 715 cases
based on Western public records and trials, New America (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee,
2016) found that one in eight who were radicalized, some of which attempted to leave America
for Iraq and Syria, were women. That is about 12% of recruits from the public sample.
Based on the collection of persons arrested and being put on trial for the January 6th
insurrection, of the 743 arrested (as of April 3rd, 2022) 102 were women. That is 13.73% of
recruits who participated in breaking into the US Capitol based on public information from the
U.S. Attorney’s Office (2022).
Common Characteristics in Targets
ISIS recruiters used their propaganda to sway “disaffected young men,” (Almutairi 2017,
pg. 24) to either move to the caliphate and fight side by side with the ISIS fighters or to commit
crimes to the Western society they live in. ISIS’s members also appealed to hardcore AntiAmericans, minority women in the Western world, and ‘vulnerable’ youth.
Those who were brought into group chats surrounding #stopthesteal targets Republican
Americans and those on the right side of politics like Libertarians. #stopthesteal also largely
alluded to the patriotic US citizens, especially military members, retired or active duty
(Helderman et.al, 2021) Often the enemy of the #stopthesteal propaganda was the Democratic
U.S. representatives and politicians, so anyone who despised the Democratic party, even if they
were in the party previously, could be targeted.
Locations
Based on the collection of data from the ISIS Twitter Census (Berger and Morgan, 2015),
the Twitter accounts that were found disseminating ISIS propaganda commonly placed their
location on the accounts as: “Islamic State”, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
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Those arrests for the January 6th insurrection and whose public trial records were
published by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (2022) in conjunction with the Department of Justice
and District of Columbia Attorney’s Office, were searched and the state where the individuals
resided in, and subsequently where the charges were brought, were compiled. The most common
states to have persons arrested for January 6th were Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, and New
York.
Traditional Media Representation
In American traditional media, ISIS is largely painted in an antagonistic light as ruthless
killers who hated the United States and killed our soldiers (Williams, 2016). On the other side,
ISIS has published traditional newspapers and flipped the American narrative to highlight
American soldiers and non-Muslims as their main enemy or “infidels” that stand in the way of
establishing their own country, or their “caliphate” (Turk, 2004).
#stopthesteal was in American traditional media, especially broadcasted by on-air
reporters and news segments on right-wing political news channels, such as Fox News. Certain
on-air broadcasters and personalities and newspaper articles with influence backed the
movement and ideology which may have helped radicalization (Center of Extremism, 2022 and
Holt and Atlantic Council’s DFR Lab, 2021).
Twitter Usage
Many sources that emerged in my collection of ISIS and #stopthesteal material
referenced Twitter specifically. Since the website was prominent for both groups, there are some
comparisons that are related strictly to Twitter usage. Limiting the data to one website can help
to determine if any patterns emerge rather than some coincidences between social media usage.
Timeline of Watched Twitter Data
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The major source that recorded ISIS propaganda on Twitter was the ISIS Twitter Census.
The authors Cunningham, Everton, & Schroeder (2015) only collected and studied media data
from Twitter.com. Their analysis followed ISIS Twitter activity from October 4, 2014, to
November 27, 2014.
For the #stopthesteal movement, the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism
(2022) monitored the activity of #stopthesteal on Twitter from November 3rd, 2020, to
December 13th, 2021.
Tweets within Time Limit
The ISIS Twitter Census found a total of 5,384,892 tweets that referenced the terror
group with the multitude of hashtags, coded words, or visual propaganda
The Center for Extremism found 200.270 tweets that specifically “mentioned the phrases
“stop the steal,” “rigged election,” or “stolen election,” or used #stopthesteal (2022)”.
Twitter Account Suspension
A U.S. Senate Hearing to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (2016, pg. 3) surrounding the dangers posed by allowing online extremism
to escalate physical violence in the US mentioned that more 100,000 ISIS-linked accounts were
banned on Twitter.
The Center of Extremism (2022) found that 150,000 accounts that were linked
with QAnon were banned from Twitter. It is important to note that QAnon was correlated to the
January 6th insurrection but was established and viral online before the election.
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Table of Comparison of Data Found
ISIS

#stopthesteal

Popular Sites

Twitter, Dawn of Glad Tidings app,
Archive.org, Justpaste.it

Twitter, Parler, Telegram, Facebook/Instagram

Hashtags

Posted propaganda to any trending
hashtags 151,167 ISIS – specific hashtags used one
of four spellings of ISIS

#stopthesteal main hashtags – the phrases rigged
election and stolen election commonly found with the
hashtag

Recruitment Style

Propaganda online, responding to
sympathizers or comments on propaganda,
continuously message and talk to them
directly, convert them to Islam, and move
them to the Middle East.

Propaganda online, reaching out to anyone who will
listen/potential recruits and bring them into group
chats, change the topic, and motivate them to attend
January 6th insurrection.

Specific
Recruitment
Example

Woman talked to ISIS supporters asking
questions, continued to be chatted with, got
gifts and books from overseas sympathetic,
converted to Islam, and contact ended
before the woman could be wed.

Woman found on health and wellness blog, moved to
other forums on social media, declared ideology (preelection), online call to action, and public mental break
that led to involuntary hospitalization and removal
from the ideology.

Gender

1 in 8 radicalized in attempts to move to
the Middle East for groups were women.

Of those arrested, 13.73% were women.

Traditional Media

US, English speaking, media commonly
antagonistic not using ISIS’s propaganda

Used a good chunk of on-air broadcasting and
influential persons backing

Common
Characteristics of
Targets

Disgruntled Westerns, anti-American
Muslims, and women to become soldier’s
wives.

Largely Republican or Liberation political party focus
and military members active or retired.

Locations

Location of Accounts “Islamic State” Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia

Location of Arrests
Florida, Texas, New York

Time of Watched
Twitter

October 4, 2014, to November 27 2014

November 3, 2020, to December 13, 2021

Tweets with time
limit

A total of 5,384,892 tweets with ISISrelated information collected

A total of 200,270 tweets with several election phrases
collected

Twitter Account
Suspension

More than 100,00 ISIS-linked accounts
suspended

More than 150,000 QAnon-linked accounts suspended
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Discussion
While the two groups, ISIS and #stopthesteal do not share ideologies, there are several
places from the results where similar answers were found. Some statistical numbers were
remarkably close to the others, i.e., the percent of women, but a larger theme emerged in front of
the statistics. Some sections had no real connection with the other’s answers but recruitment
style, websites used, and account suspensions all showed resemblance.
A major part of the comparative study is the implications that arise with the similarities
between two distinctive groups. The most passionate supporters of these two groups would hate,
loathe each other. In some cases, the two might have attempted to kill the other in their own
sense of patriotic ideology. With such dedication between members with a deep-rooted sense of
faith and driven passion, the assumption would be that the two groups would operate in different
manners in total opposites. If two groups with opposing ideologies are manipulating social media
in similar ways, then new and emerging groups are likely to continue this pattern. Recognizing
extremism before it can escalate to violence is crucial. In some cases, such as the two recruitment
examples, close friends and family step in before someone, the individual or innocent bystanders,
can be harmed. In 2019, one man entered an Orlando nightclub and killed forty-nine people.
After an investigation into his ties to the ISIS terror group, the agency explicitly stated that it is
“highly confident'' that the Orlando killer [. . .] was ‘radicalized at least in part through the
Internet’.” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, 2016, pg. 2). Finding out that the killer was
radicalized online after the fact does not immediately deter others from being radicalized.
Disadvantages to the Results
The problem is these results do not tell us how to solve the problem of circulating
extremism online, they only demonstrate how much worse it could be. Online social media
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algorithms are private intellectual property owned and protected by the largest corporations on
the planet. While these sites have addressed the major problems that stir up on their sites, the
sites are not physically responsible for the ensuing violence and are not forced to change
anything on their websites. Across the years 2018-2021, several employees from Facebook
brought forth concerns involving Facebook lack of accountability surrounding its effects on its
users. One of the women who emerged in 2021 quit from her position on the civic
misinformation section of the company released thousands of documents showing Facebook’s
mishandling of misinformation surrounding the 2020 election (Mac and Kang). After Facebook
was on the front pages of news outlets as the whistleblower met with US Senators and the US
Security and Exchange Commission, many other sites have taken precautions to avoid being
caught with allowing the material on their sites. As more violence could be created, circulated,
and planned on social media websites, those same websites could be the focus of large lawsuits
by human rights organizations or the victims of the violence for the site's inadvertent role in the
crimes. Although online social media networks have a large responsibility to curb extremism on
their sites, a simple technological algorithm will not stop extremists. In the book, the Propaganda
Model Today (Pedro-Carañana, Broudy, and Klaehn, 2018, pg. 84), the authors criticized the use
of older models and theories surrounding new online propaganda and quote, “[There is] no
technological fix to political and socio-economic problems”.
On top of the social media’s role in filtering through hate, individuals online are set up to
be swept into these groups. With social media being consumed by 10-year-olds and 80-year-olds,
there is an incredibly large population pool that extremists can fish through to find the people
vulnerable to manipulation and rhetoric, or persons already willing to commit violence but
without cause. Anyone is allowed on social media, but there is a large burden on those who
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choose to be online to understand that websites are not the only entity interested in collecting
your information. The assumption that one can be on social media websites independently of
anyone else’s influence is negligent to the numerous groups online that target anyone they can.
The usage of two groups that do not resemble the other in ideology for the study was incredibly
important to showcasing that the targeting of ‘average’ people on the Internet is not a tactic used
by one specific group, or specific ideology. With the large pool of recruits, websites that
specifically trap its user into groups, and anonymity as a number one priority for websites, social
media is a breeding ground for turning stay-at-home moms, 9-5 office workers, recently
unemployed men, married couples with six kids, or anyone else into extremists.
Recommendations of What to Do Next
Organizations with the time and resources to track and watch trends that emerge with
groups needed to put forth the work to recognize prominent groups with violent tendencies.
While US and world law enforcement agencies are tracking terrorist and following tips about
possible extremists, law enforcement is a reactionary tool. Preventative measures are possible,
and the similarities between these groups show that patterns are possible to see (at least
posthumously).
Every aspect of research into social media, whether it be communications, marketing,
political action, or anywhere else that social media can influence, is begging for more research
into social media. Political theory sees strong correlations between social media and the
development of political discourse, campaigning and election polling, how we develop our
political ideas and how we find our evidence for those ideas (Vogel, Auxier, and Anderson,
2021). The data displays that social media is not a stagnant entity that can be studied when
researchers have the time and resources. Between 2011 and 2021, two groups with varying
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endgames managed to manipulate the Internet, namely Twitter, in similar fashions to the same
results, physical violence and death. 3 months is all the time needed to rowdy nearly seven
hundred people into committing felonies against the US government; all other factors such as
ideology, willingness, legitimacy of the issue and connections were already established or
developed and wielded within three months. With social media sites in the hot seat as the US
Congress attempts to understand how these private corporations are influencing propaganda and
hate on their websites. While the US government and private corporations lock antlers in legal
battles, researchers, scientists, and intellectuals need to invest the same amount of passion into
social media. The tangled, confusing, complex mess that has evolved into the Internet we use
today is not independent of any field of study. Political theorists have already pushed for study,
as does this paper. There is only so much an analysis of online radicalization of US citizens that
occurs without accessible data through website accessibility in connection with extremism and
others to shift through and interpret the mass amounts of data that can be found across the
Internet. 3 months is significantly less time than researchers will need to begin understanding
just how much politics can be influenced by social media, but that has been proven an effective
timeline for the Internet to turn the average American business owner with a white picket fence
family into criminals who attacked US Capitol Police Officers before breaking into the US
Capitol.
On top of the rapid escalation of online extremist effectiveness in recruiting ‘average’
citizens into their ideology, the lack of defined line in the sand of what is the starting point of
radicalization is an area of study in desperate need of understanding. Radicalization is not an
inherently negative process; it can teach us humility, inclusion and diversity, the necessary
pieces that can fight violent extremism. Radicalization and extremism that expand past its past
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uses and understanding how people wield them as weapons is the beginning to finding peace
before violence becomes the answer.
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Conclusion
Online extremism is rapidly growing and the barriers that are placed in its way, with the
nature of account suspension and banning education about bots and how sites operate. While the
radicalization process has adapted into online platforms, there are ways to fight the changes in
person. The US Senate Hearings (2016) about the growing extremist groups online and social
media recruitment found that,
While the radicalization and recruitment can start online, what [the FBI investigations]
have seen and what the data shows … individuals around someone who is being
radicalized - - friends, neighbors, peers, associates - - see some type of behavior who is
being radicalized.
While there are obstacles to combat and fight against the modernization and technological shifts
in propaganda and recruitment messages, these efforts are not enough to curb the ease that
groups can manipulate and target the websites to radicalize individuals. With social media
algorithm, a vast pool of potential candidates, and public strong feelings about a variety of issues
on the extremist’s side, the problems are not going away; they are growing.
My thesis found that the timeline necessary to radicalize an individual to make major life
changes, moving to a completely different part of the world or committing felonies and going to
prison, significantly shortened, and the group that perturbates the radicalization process did not
need a devout following or defined group dynamic before growing and recruiting online. The
similarities that arose in my comparative study between ISIS and #stopthesteal’s online presence
defied their ideological differences and innate hatred for one another. Their tactics and strategies
were used based on the efficiency and swiftness that allowed for recruitment.
An abundance of research into the Internet and the interactions that can occur on social
media websites. There are multitudes of topics, studies, and focus areas that can gain knowledge
and resources from starting to record information online by research colleges and institutions or
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non-profit organization; the untapped potential of study and the possible life-changing effects
that would result could shape how we use the Internet for the rest of time and groups need to
start their examinations now. The Internet has become a global, unpredictable, and omnipotent
being that our culture has become irreversibly tied to. Letting the web run rampant and
unwatched will result in unpredictable, turbulent, and deadly consequences.

31

Reference
Almutairi, Abdullah. 2017. "SOCIAL MEDIA AS A RECRUITMENT TOOL FOR ISIS"
Masters Essays. 81.
Andrews, Travis M. 2020. "She fell into QAnon and went viral for destroying a Target mask
display. Now she's rebuilding her life." The Washington Post, (November 11).
Berger, J. M. 2018. Extremism. Essential Knowledge Series. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
——— 2014."How ISIS Games Twitter." The Atlantic, (June 16).
Berger, J. M., and Jonathon Morgan. 2015. The ISIS Twitter Census. (March).
Bloom, Mia, Hicham Tiflati, and John Horgan. 2017. "Navigating ISIS's Preferred Platform:
Telegram." Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 6 (July 11): 1242-54.
Callimachi, Rukmini. 2015. "ISIS and the Lonely Young American." The New York Times, (June
28), sec. A.
Center on Extremism. 2020. "A Year After the Insurrection, 2020 Election Lies Continue to
Animate the Right." ADL. Last modified January 4, 2022.
Conway, Maura. 2016. "Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and
Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
40, no. 1 (April 12): 77-98.
Cunningham, Daniel, Sean F. Everton, and Robert Schroeder. 2015. Social Media and the ISIS
Narrative (March 20).
Daly, Kyle, and Sara Fischer. 2021. "The online far right is moving underground." Axios
(January 12).
District of Columbia v. Proud Boys International. 2021. No. 1:12-cv-03267 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14).
Doric, Marija. 2016. "The problem of defining contemporary right-wing extremism in political
theory." In ResearchGate. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies, n.d. Previously
published in Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta Nis, (January).
Helderman, Rosalind S., et al. 2021. "Court Documents Point to How Trump's Rhetoric Fueled
Rioters Who Attacked Capitol." The Washington Post, (February 7), Gale Academic
OneFile.
Holt, Jared, and Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab. 2021. #StopTheSteal: Timeline
of Social Media and Extremist Activities Leading to 1/6 Insurrection. Edited by Andy
Carvin. (February 10).

32

Korhan, Orhan, and Metin Ersoy. 2016. "Usability and functionality factors of the social network
site application users from the perspective of uses and gratification'" Qual Quant 50,
1799-1816.
Lasswell, Harold D. 1927. "The Theory of Political Propaganda." The American Political Science
Review 21, no. 3 (August): 627-31.
Lobanov-Rostovsky, Nina. 1989. "Soviet Propaganda Porcelain." The Journal of Decorative and
Propaganda Arts 11: 126-41.
Mac, Ryan, and Cecilia Kang. 2021. "Whistle-Blower Says Facebook 'Chooses Profits Over
Safety.'" New York Times (New York City, NY), (October 4) sec. B.
Pape, Robert, Jr. 2021. "Study: Few US Capitol Rioters Had Ties to Right-Wing Groups."
Interview. Window to the World. Written by Quinn Myers. (Aired February 15) on Public
Broadcasting Service.
Pedro-Carañana, Joan, Daniel Broudy, and Jeffery Klaehn. 2018. The Propaganda Model Today:
Filtering Perception and Awareness. Vol. 8. London: University of Westminster Press.
"Propaganda." 2007. In Oxford English Dictionary, Third ed., edited by OED Online (June).
Southers, Erroll. 2017. Homegrown Violent Extremism. London: Routledge.
Taylor, Philip M. 2013. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World
to the Present Era. 3rd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Turk, Austin T. (2004) "Sociology of Terrorism." Annual Review of Sociology 30, no. 1 (August
1): 271-86.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2016. ISIS
Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the Internet and Social
Media: Hearings Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
114th, 2d Sess..
United Nations Security Council. 2004. Threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts, Resolution 1566, 5053rd sess. S/RES/1566 (8 October). New York: UN.
U.S. Attorney's Office U.S Department of Justice. 2022. Capitol Breach Cases. Compiled by
U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (April 3).
Vogel, Emily A., Brooke Auxier, and Monica Anderson. 2021. Partisan differences in social
media use show up for some platforms, but not Facebook. (April 7).

33

Wahlström, Mattias, and Anton Törnberg. 2019. "Social Media Mechanisms for Right-Wing
Political Violence in the 21st Century: Discursive Opportunities, Group Dynamics, and
Co-Ordination." Terrorism and Political Violence 33, no. 4 (April 4): 766-87.
Williams, Lauren. 2016.Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media. Compiled by
Lowy Institute for International Policy (February 1).

